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The Limits of Globalization and the Future of
Administrative Law: From Government to
Governance
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.
INTRODUCTION
Global processes-be they economic, social, or cultural-affect the roles
states play in key regulatory settings at home and abroad. The future of
domestic administrative law will be closely tied to the ways in which
lawmakers succeed or fail to understand the dynamics of globalization.
Global processes are integral to the basic frameworks of politics and markets
within which regulatory reforms have developed in the United States since the
1970s and will continue to develop in the future. Such frameworks provide
the pragmatic structure within which administrative law now evolves, opening
the way to new theories of governance that combine elements of both the
domestic and the international.
One of the hallmarks of regulation in the global era' has been the shift
from state-centered, command-control approaches to market forms of
regulation.2 This trend goes well beyond the use of market incentives in rules
issued by administrative agencies.3 It also includes partial and sometimes
wholesale delegation of certain public functions and responsibilities to the
private sector.4 Prisons, welfare, healthcare, and education, as well as
* Alfred C. Aman, Jr., is the Dean and the Roscoe C. O'Byme Professor of Law at the Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington. I wish to thank Paul Durkes ('02) and Beth Caseman ('01) for
their excellent research assistance. I also wish to thank Professors John Applegate, Yvonne Cripps, and
Carol Greenhouse for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 1 mark the beginning of the global era of regulation with the advent of various deregulatory
reforms in the 1970s and early 1980s. See AFREDC. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INAGLOBALERA
4, 125-130 (1992) (setting forth three overlapping, yet distinct eras of regulation in the United States).
2. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE-THE DFFUSION OF POWER IN THE
WORLD EcONOMY 46 (1996); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBAUZATION 28 (1996); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future Oriented Perspective on
the Public/Private Distinction. Federalism. and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 769, 780-91
(1998) (hereinafter Aman, The Globalizing State].
3. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L 171 (1988).
4. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Supreme Court invalidated the Bituminous
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municipal services such as snow removal and garbage collection, now often
involve the private sector directly in a variety of public/private partnerships.5
Delegation to the private sector represents an important aspect of more
general ways in which global processes encourage and accelerate what has
been called "third party government"6 whereby "crucial elements of public
authority are shared with a host of nongovernmental or other governmental
actors."7  The seemingly borderless nature of telecommunications and
intellectual exchange, and the relatively easy flow of goods, capital, pollution,
and disease across jurisdictional lines, increasingly requires a global
conception of both problems and opportunities. The same fluidity with which
borders can be crossed expands the need for cooperation, but also the intensity
of the competition likely to occur among governmental entities that are
territorially based. For example, private entities, in deciding where to locate
their businesses or where to make their investments, can choose among many
locations, generating competition among various localities for the jobs and
Coal Conservation Act as an unconditional delegation of legislative power to private parties, specifically
large coal producers. The Court stated:
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an
unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private
persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business... [1]n the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the power
to regulate the business of another, and especially of a competitor. And a state which
attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference
with personal liberty and private property.
Id. at 311. As one commentator has noted, the Supreme Court has not invalidated legislation on delegation
grounds since Carter Coal, and the private exercise of governmental power delegated by state or local
governments has not been a federal constitutional issue since the 1920s. See David M. Lawrence, Private
Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647,649 (1986). See also Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding delegations of authority to EPA). But see Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J.
1399 (2000); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 584 (2000)
("While the federal judiciary may decline to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate delegations
to administrative agencies.... it might still invalidate private delegations in future cases, especially if the
delegated authority implicates "core" public powers. A delegation could prove so sweeping that it deprives
the executive of its Article II powers, thereby raising a separation of powers concern.'?). See also Harold
J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority
Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L REV. 62 (1990); Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
5. See generally Hon. Patricia M. Wald,LookingForwardto the Next Millennium: Social Previews
to Legal Change, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1085 (1997).
6. See Dr. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming June 2001).
7. See Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of
Privatization, FORDHAM URB. LJ. (forthcoming June 2001).
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opportunities for economic growth that certain private actors can help
provide Such problems often require multi-jurisdictional responses.
For state entities to conceptualize problems on a global basis, or to
contemplate solutions or actions across domestic and international borders,
they must often cooperate with other governmental units or form partnerships
with nongovernmental actors that are not similarly tied to any fixed place.
The end result of such collaborations is a growing body of international law
that seeks to further both mutually beneficial cooperation among states9 and
new forms of domestic and international governance that rely extensively on
nongovernmental (private) actors to carry out public responsibilities.'0
In short, the effects of globalization are not limited to the international
level of policymaking and law. The same forces that make cooperation
necessary and fuel competition at the international level are at work at all
levels of domestic governance. Administrative agencies share issues and
approaches through increased contact and involvement." States,
municipalities, and local governing units also compete for investments of
various kinds in their jurisdictions. They, too, are limited in their
extraterritorial powers and must cooperate with various
entities-governmental and nongovernmental. The importance of the role that
nongovernmental organizations now play at the international level is matched
by private actors at the local level. The need to extend international law to
some nongovernmental actors is linked to a similar need to understand and, in
many instances, reconceptualize the role of administrative law at the domestic
level.' Private actors can more easily conceptualize and implement solutions
for problems without regard to any single territory. This creates an important
incentive for cooperation between private actors and states that are eager to
solve their problems in an effective and efficient fashion. 3
8. See generally PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT 1-8 (2d ed. 1992).
9. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental
Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 106 (1995).
10. See Stephan Hobe, Global Changes to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of
Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 192 (1997). See also Aman, The
Globalizing State, supra note 2.
11. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, TheAccountability ofGovernment Networks, 8 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 349 (2001).
12. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act:
Globalization, Democracy, and the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest, The Earl A. Snyder Lecture in
International Law (February 3, 1999), in 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397,412-18 (1999) [hereinafter
Aman, Snyder Lecture].
13. For a discussion of how private actors may provide municipal services more efficiently than
governments can, due to advantages of scale, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy
2001]
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How one reconceptualizes domestic administrative law significantly
depends on how one regards the effects of globalization on law and markets.
Public/private partnerships are seen mainly in two ways. One way of seeing
such partnerships is as a step away from the state. Increased reliance on
markets and the private sector provides opportunities to minimize the role of
the state, by emphasizing bright-line distinctions between the public and the
private-and by casting the market as essentially voluntary in nature and an
end in itself.'4 This is a laissez-faire approach, one that underscores a long-
standing debate in administrative law between those who see the role of
administrative law as protecting the individual from the state and those who
see its role instead as facilitating legislative policies and goals. 5 Another way
of viewing public/private partnerships, however, is as an extension of the
state. Rather than directly resisting global processes, the delegation of public
functions to private actors represents new ways for states to carry out their
responsibilities. From this perspective, markets are a form of regulation and
not simply the substitution of a wholly private regime for what once was
public. Public law values such as transparency, participation, and fairness
remain relevant, even though private actors now carry out various tasks that
can be appropriately called governmental. 6
This Article argues that it is important to understand deregulation and
privatization as often being extensions of the state, thereby requiring new
ways of assuring transparency and public participation. To the extent one
views the market, market processes, and private actors more as a means to
achieve public goals than as ends unto themselves, a reconceptualization of
both how we think about administrative law and how we think about markets
and market discourse is required. Administrative law, traditionally
conceptualized, deals primarily with the way in which state entities exercise
and explain the use of their discretion. It focuses on the means by which
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and various combinations thereof,
are allocated to and then exercised by various governmental entities called
administrative agencies. 7 Administrative law, like international law, is state-
Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, FORDHAM
URB. LJ. (forthcoming June 2001) [hereinafter Arnan, Privatization and the Democracy Problem].
14. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 2, at 803-08.
15. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW & ADMINSTRATION 29-90 (2d ed. 1997).
16. Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 2, at 808-16.
17. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure, 78 COLUM.
L REV. 258 (1978).
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centered. "8 Markets, on the other hand, involve voluntary arrangements and
the private sector.
In contrast, globalization processes encourage forms of governance
involving new uses of the private sector to achieve public ends.'9 Depending
upon how the uses of the market are conceptualized, globalization processes
can complicate both the form and the content of democracy. They rearrange
the lines between public and private entities and can appear to enlarge the
private sector by delegating functions to private forums. They can also insert
the state into the private sector in new ways. Globalization thus yields
intended and unintended effects on the scenarios in which democratic
participation has been traditionally relevant (at least theoretically) within and
between nation-states.
Thus, the shift in focus from states to markets and from government to
governance is significant. It places in stark relief some of the externalities of
globalization,20 perhaps the foremost of which is the "democracy deficit,"'
sometimes called the "accountability problem."2 The democracy deficit in
globalization arises from a number of factors, most notably the state-centered
nature of our domestic public law and a conception of markets that assumes
a bright line between the public and the private or, in effect, states and
markets. The state-action doctrine,23 the Due Process clauses coupled with the
statutory requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 4 and the
Freedom of Information Act 5, the Privacy Act,26 and other state-oriented
statutes, all focus legal attention on actions taken by states and their agencies.
The traditional line between public and private, or markets and government,
reinforces treatment of these activities as if two very different systems were
involved. The procedural and informational requirements of these statutes are
largely confined to state actors.
18. Id.
19. See Arnan, Privatization and the Democracy Problem. supra note 13 (discussing privatized
prisons and the privatization of other traditional governmental services).
20. For an excellent discussion of the various externalities of globalization, see JAN AART SCHOLTE,
GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 207 (2000).
2 1. See Alfred C. Amnan, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem, supra note 13. See also
SCHOLTE, supra note 20, at 261.
22. Id. See also Anan, Privatization and the Democracy Problem, supra note 13; Philip G. Cerny,
Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT'L ORG. 595 (1995).
23. Anan, Privatization and the Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2001).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552, etseq.(2001).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2001).
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The delegation of public functions to private actors bypasses the
transparency provided for in these statutes, thereby producing a democracy
deficit.27 When public functions are carried out by private actors,
transparency and participation-the keystones of administrative
democracy-often diminish in importance or prominence, as if all markets and
private activities were the same. But even if this is not the case, and the state
action doctrine is able to reach certain private entities in some contexts,28 the
public law remedies that apply may not always be appropriate for the
governance needs of public/private partnerships.29 The mixtures of power that
result require new conceptions of the state and administrative procedure,
conceptions unlikely to emerge in the context of ajudicial proceeding focused
on the rights of an individual.
Just as the processes of globalization and the new governance structures
that result from them may in some contexts require the extension of
international law to nongovernmental entities," there is also a need for the
legislature to "privatize" the APA.a' By referring to privatization of the APA,
however, I do not mean procedural deregulation for state actors, but the
inverse-the extension of various procedural approaches developed for the
public sector to the private sector, albeit in new forms, so as to provide
greater transparency and accountability by private actors who carry out the
public's business.
I use the APA in large part as a heuristic device-a set of generic
procedural principles designed to provide a procedural paradigm applicable
to the essential aspects of the governance structures now emerging. Thus,
privatizing the APA does not mean we should simply extend the procedural
requirement of the old APA in a mechanical fashion. That statute was
designed for certain kinds of governmental agencies engaged primarily in
27. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Information, Privacy and Technology: Citizens, Clients, or Consumers?.
in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 325 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds.,
2000).
28. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). The Court held that the immunity
doctrine should not be extended to private prison guards because "marketplace pressures provide the private
firm with strong incentives to avoid overly timid, insufficiently vigorous, unduly fearful, or 'non-arduous'
employee job performance." Id. at 410.
30. See Hobe, supra note 10, at 193. See also Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization:
The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
579(1999).
3 1. See Aman, Snyder Lecture, supra note 12, at 412-18. See generally Aman, Privatization and the
Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
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economic regulation.32 The effects of globalization, especially the democracy
deficit referenced above,33 necessitate new ways of understanding state
sovereignty, and require a reconceptualization of administrative law if such
basic features as public participation, fairness, and transparency are to be
maintained.
The new administrative law will be more market-oriented, flexible,
cooperative, and informational in nature than the adversarial nature of various
aspects of the APA. 3" To conceptualize the procedural approaches that are
necessary for governance rather than government structures, it is useful to
consult some aspects of international law." The various informal ways in
which norms are created and enforced at the international level is a useful
analogy for the ways in which procedures might apply at the private, domestic
level.3 ' At the heart of such an approach is information. An information-based
approach to administrative law, particularly when extended to the private
sector, could help provide transparency without smothering the efficiencies
that market approaches to issues might produce.
In short, how policymakers conceptualize globalization will have much to
do with how we reconceptualize administrative law. The primary purpose of
this Article is to articulate various relationships of the market and
administrative law to globalization, with a view towards developing a
rationale for a new administrative law that makes it possible to extend public
law values to private governance structures. The new administrative law
should be one that focuses more on the functions and effects of the power
exercised over citizens and less on the definitional criteria by which one might
distinguish the public and private nature of the entities that actually exercise
that power. 7
32. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L REV. 447 (1986).
33. See text accompanying note 21, supra.
34. Indeed, the judicialization of the APA, especially in the ways in which hybrid rulemaking has
evolved as well as various approaches to risk assessment, has led to what some commentators have called
"rule ossification." See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47
ADMIN. L REV. 59 (1995); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE LJ. 1385 (1992) (discussing effects of additional required procedures, analytical
requirements, and external review mechanisms that impede agencies' ability to implement efficient formal
rulemaking). These kinds of approaches and outcomes would not be appropriate for the needs of the more
global, flexible approach to procedure envisioned in this essay.
35. See generally ABRAM CHAYES &ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995).
For a more extended discussion of an information approach to the APA, see Aman, Privatization and the
Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
36. Id.
37. An instructive approach to the public/private distinction can be found in Regina v. Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers, erparte Datafin, Plc., 1987 Q.B. 815, 846-49 (Eng. C.A.) (rejecting a formalistic
2001]
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I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE MARKET
Globalization is often confused with homogenization-conceptualized not
unlike the Sherwin-Williams paint logo showing paint pouring over the entire
globe. There may be some aspects of globalization that do or can reach the
entire globe, but this conception of globalization is far too overstated to be of
analytical use for purposes of this Article. As I use the term, globalization
refers to a multiplicity of extraterritorial activities and their local effects.
These effects need not be global in the sense of achieving universal impact.
Rather, global processes refer to complex, dynamic, legal, economic, and
social processes that operate within an integrated whole, in a manner that
ignores territorial boundaries.3" The integrated whole may be a region or just
a part of various jurisdictions that may or may not be contiguous. s9 The scale
of the problem or the operation involved is determined not by territorial
boundary lines, but by factors such as cost, the scope of the problem involved,
or the reach of a particular technology or an economic opportunity envisioned.
Factors such as these take precedence over arbitrary jurisdictional boundary
lines for decisionmakers-public and private-when it comes to
conceptualizing how best to deal with certain problems or how to maximize
the potential for new opportunities.'
Another aspect of globalization processes is that they involve various
multidirectional flows-flows of ideas, images, goods, services, and people,
and the communications networks necessary to sustain them.4 What drives
these flows of ideas, goods, and capital, however, may have little to do with
states directly. This is because it is difficult for states to exercise power
beyond their borders. As a result, the social and economic forces that
determine, for example, where and how capital might flow, or labor markets
develop, are increasingly denationalized." The end result is a larger role for
approach to the question of when procedures apply in favor of a criterion that requires the Court to consider
the nature of the power wielded by a particular entity-public or private).
38. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 2, at 780 n.32.
39. Id. at 780-83.
40. Id.
41. See generally ARJuN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE 237 (1996). As Professor Slaughter's
paper in this symposium shows, these flows also involve governmental actors. See Slaughter, supra note
11.
42. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN
nERATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABoR FLow (1988).
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markets and private actors in dealing with borderless problems and
opportunities.
This does not mean that states have no regulatory role to play; but even
when they are involved, they are rarely in a position of autonomous power.
They usually seek to cooperate with other states and, increasingly, nonstate
actors as well, in order to affect policy outcomes within and beyond their own
borders. Such collaborations, when applied to problems such as global
pollution or human rights, help create a more cosmopolitan body of
international law at the global level, one defined by problems and solutions
that transcend traditional nation-state interests. 3  The economic and
competitive aspects of globalization, however, can also encourage a more
state-focused competition to ensure continued or new investment in a
particular place. As a result, markets and market processes now play a major
role in governance at all levels of government. Markets can be viewed as
regulatory tools in environmental contexts, but also as the primary means of
winning the global competition for investment and economic growth in a
particular place. Indeed, while issues involving ozone depletion or human
rights encourage a more cosmopolitan, cooperative approach to law, issues
involving the economic growth that comes from the development of new
technologies, or the availability of an educated workforce, tend to fuel a more
intense and locally-based form of competition between and among various
state jurisdictions.
The multidirectionality of the flows of problems and opportunities that
characterize globalization requires multilevels of coordinated governance, as
all levels of domestic government enter into new relationships. The global
nature of some problems necessitates coordinated state, federal, and
international approaches to issues, as well as the use of private or
nongovernmental actors." Local governmental units also seek to minimize
costs by cooperating with other local units or making use of the private sector
through privatization of traditional governmental services." How one
conceptualizes the relationship of globalization to markets, and their
relationship to government, can greatly affect the legal approaches that are
available for providing transparency and participation in governance, whether
43. See DAvID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATONS 70-74(1999) (discussingcosmopolitan law).
44. See SCHoLTEsupra note 20, at 143. ("[M]ultilateral policies have arisen in response to civil strife,
labor policies, technology standards, industrial subsidies, local environmental protection schemes, and
much more. Through multilateralism, as through so much else, globalization has dissolved the distinctions
between 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs..
45. See Symposium, supra note 7.
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it occurs on the local, state, national, or international levels. These
relationships of globalization to markets vary from laissez faire at one end of
the spectrum to more activist approaches to regulation on the other, where the
market is used primarily as a means of accomplishing public-oriented goals,
rather than being an end in itself.
A. Laissez Faire and Market Populism
Some commentators and policymakers view markets as the dominant force
fueling a new global capitalism.' Used in this sense, globalization implies
uniformity, or homogeneity, of laws and markets.4 It suggests, for example,
that there are certain products, ideas, or legal provisions that can be marketed
or adapted on a global basis. This has a one-size-fits-all premise built into it."
This view of globalization sometimes includes the argument that globalization
is, in effect, a form of "Americanization" or "Westernization."'49 Most
importantly, this view of globalization often implies a concept of
linearity-i.e. these processes are progressing almost relentlessly toward a
global market and a high degree of uniformity in laws, culture, and the
economy.' ° With such a conception of globalization, the role of the state often
merges with markets, making it difficult to distinguish among those situations
where the market is truly private and where it is, in effect, a pragmatic means
for achieving public ends.5
Neoliberal regulatory reforms are very much of a piece with the economic
competition this view of globalization promotes.5" Policies that further market
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM GREmDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL
CAirrALISM (1997).
47. See HELD ET AL., supra note 43, at 3-5. Held describes this as 'the hyperglobalist thesis.' "For
the hyperglobalizers... contemporary globalization defines a new era in which peoples everywhere are
increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace[.]" Id. at 2. See also Kalman Applbaum,
Crossing Borders: Globalization as Myth and Charter in American Transnational Consumer Marketing,
27 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 257 (2000).
48. Held, supra note 43, at 4 ("For those who are currently marginalized, the worldwide diffusion of
a consumerist ideology also imposes a new sense of identity, displacing traditional cultures and ways of life.
The global spread of liberal democracy further reinforces a sense of an emerging global civilization defined
by universal standards of economic and political organization.").
49. See, e.g., Philip Allot, The True Function of Law in the International Community, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391 (1998).
50. HELD ET AL., supra note 43, at 4. See also, e.g., GREIDER, supra note 46, at 12 (describing
globalization as "a wondrous machine... running out of control toward some sort of abyss").
51. Id. See also THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD 47 (2000).
52. Id. Frank argues that the Republican congressional victory in 1994 was a clarifying intersection
of government regulation and economic competition, stating that "democracy was closely related to the holy
acts of buying and selling, and that those who try to control the market are. therefore setting themselves
FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE
goals are affirmatively sought by states, either in an attempt to extend the
markets of their own constituents or to attract more investment to their
respective jurisdictions." There is often a sense of inevitability attached to
such views of globalization, as if the inexorable process of the market cannot
be averted. 4 At the extreme, such views of globalization suggest a substantial
diminishment of the role of states and state sovereignty in particular." Indeed,
some commentators have gone so far as to decree globalization "the end of
history." 6
For many who hold such views, laissez-faire economics and governance
inevitably coincide. " Markets are given preference to states and the state's
primary role is to ensure that markets can develop and thrive. This view of
markets and their relationship to globalization emphasizes the competitive
aspects of globalization, including a view of law that is skeptical at best. For
what some call "the hyperglobalists," markets and the competition they
engender, rather than cooperation, are at the basis of approaches to
governance at all levels.5 8
Deferring to the market so completely would, in my view, exacerbate the
democracy deficit, as public, state-oriented processes of governance give way
to laissez-faire economics. But markets also can be seen as substituting for
democracy, too, by furthering what Thomas Frank characterizes as market
populism. This is a view that sees markets, in addition to being mediums of
exchange, as mediums of consent as well. Recalling the 1980s and 1990s,
Frank critically describes this approach as one in which
Markets expressed the popular will more articulately and
more meaningfully than did mere elections. Markets
conferred democratic legitimacy; markets were a friend of the
against nothing less than the almighty will of the people themselves." Id. at 47.
53. See, e.g., ROBERT PERRUCCI, JAPANESE AuTo TRANSPLANTS IN THE HEARTLAND: CORPORATISM
AND COMMUNITY (1994).
54. HELD ET AL., supra note 43, at 3-5.
55. Id
56. Francis Fukuyarna, The End of History, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 4. "What we may be
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but
the end of history as such; that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Id. For an elaboration of
Fukuyama's thesis, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). For an
excellent discussion of Fukuyama's thesis along with her personal reflections, see Susan Marks, The End
of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449 (1997).
57. See generally THE GROUP OF LISBON, LIMITS TO COMPETITION (1995).
58. HELD ET AL., supra note 43, at 3-5.
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little guy; markets brought down the pompous and snooty;
markets gave us what we wanted; markets looked out for our
interests.59
A view of markets as a substitute for democracy makes the public/private
distinction meaningless from a procedural point of view. If markets and
market choices are equated with political choice, the enlargement of the
private sector brought about by denationalization, privatization, and
deregulation need not be viewed as a problem. One way of dealing with the
public/private distinction is, essentially, to abolish it, making the private sector
and the voluntary bases of the market the dominant form of governance.
B. Resistance and Transformation-Markets as Regulatory Regimes
Other perspectives on globalization, however, focus on resistance to
global processes. Such approaches assume that global processes can be
shaped or influenced by domestic law, if not stopped completely.6' At one
end of the spectrum, such views of government power are almost on a par with
beliefs in a laissez-faire market. They assume that, if there is the political
will, states can block those aspects of globalization they wish to eliminate.
The public/private distinction is best dealt with by extending our view of what
is public, to the point that it is almost all encompassing. Some forms of
protectionist legislation and anti-immigration legislation reflect such views of
globalization and the power of the state. 2
As noted above, another view of the relationship of globalization to
markets and law is premised on the idea that markets are not ends in
themselves, but means for carrying out public goals. Markets are not, thus, in
opposition to the state, nor are they a substitute for democracy; decisions by
59. FRANK, supra note 51, at xiv.
60. See generally GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE (Barry K Gills ed., 2000).
61. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 2, at 806-08. See also HELD ET AL., supra note 43,
at 5-7. Held describes this view of globalization as 'the skeptical thesis.' Id. According to Held, "the
sceptics consider the hyperglobalist thesis as fundamentally flawed and also politically naive since it
underestimates the enduring power of national governments to regulate international economic activity.
Rather than being out of control, the forces of internationalization themselves depend on the regulatory
power of national governments to ensure continuing economic liberalization." Id. at 5.
62. Id. See also Walter Bagehot, Pat Buchanan s Happy Days, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9. 1995, at 37
(discussing how Buchanan wishes to put a "freeze on immigration"); Marc Sandalow, GOP's Immigration
Package Calls for More Fences, Guards, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 11, 1994, at A3 (stating that more
than 200 bills were before Congress on anti-immigration stances).
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lawmakers to opt for the market need not be equated with laissez-faire
economics.63  The market can be a powerful regulatory tool. Market
approaches to problems create incentives that can lower regulatory costs and,
at the same time, encourage public interest outcomes. Markets take on a
greater prominence at both international and domestic levels of government,
but not because of a philosophical decision to cede power to the private sector,
as if this were a zero-sum game between "the public" and "the private."
Rather, the market and private actors are more prominent because they can
approach problems without the limitations of arbitrary, territorial boundaries
imposed on them. Market discourses represent a pragmatic language that is
easily understood by many actors within and outside various jurisdictions,
precisely because they can blur the differences between such opposed
positions.
For similar reasons, denationalization often results in privatization or
varying degrees of deregulation at state and local levels of government. The
intensity of the global competition associated with the now borderless nature
of many industries, or components of those industries, increases the closer one
comes to the actual sites of these plants or operations. This is because these
are the locations where taxes are paid and local residents employed, thereby
bolstering local economies. The competitive edge, or what I have elsewhere
called the global currencies' used to compete effectively in a global economy,
often consists of the cost-effectiveness and the competency of the services
provided by government. Privatization of some of these services may save
money and increase the level of service. What may appear to be a choice of
the market over the government is, in many circumstances, a choice that
reflects the economies of scale that a private actor, not bounded by territory,
can realize when providing the service in question. The more cost-effective
government is in providing services, the more competitive it will be in
attracting new investment to that particular jurisdiction.
Contrary to the claims of some skeptics who wish to wall out global forces
entirely, globalization simply does not involve the kinds of externalities that
domestic law can directly control. Still, this does not mean that global forces
cannot be shaped to enhance local goals. There is nothing inevitable about
global processes and their outcomes.6  Global processes can create
63. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 2, at 808-12.
64. See Aman, Privatization and the Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
65. See HELD ET AL,., supra note 43, at 7-10. Held describes this point of view as
'transformationalist.' According to Held,
transfornationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of globalization; nor do they
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transformative opportunities for domestic law. Global forces merge the global
and the local into one complex modality through various communities-legal
and civil society-and their reactions to new possibilities and challenges.
Equating globalization and homogenization similarly misses the point. As
public functions move to the private sector and jurisdictions compete for
investment, jobs, and economic development, globalization is the net effect
of the responses of individual legal regimes. Further, globalization is not a
simple one-way process, but is rather a rubric for the many sites where
public/private partnerships are encouraged, modified, or transformed." The
future of administrative law is, I believe, inextricably tied to the ways in
which our legal system reacts to such global forces; in sum, globalization is
not a linear process.
In Part II, I examine administrative law and its future in light of these
different approaches to globalization, especially a transformative approach to
global processes. I argue that the primary purpose of a new administrative law
is to mitigate the externalities of globalization, in particular, the democracy
deficit, by facilitating the flow of information from the public and the private
sectors. Information can help create an informed citizenry and more effective
governance. This is best accomplished by an approach to the public/private
distinction that focuses primarily on the nature and function of the power
relationships between public and private actors.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law has long involved a debate involving the appropriate
governmental role in the market.67 The basic questions of when and how the
government should intervene in the market have traditionally been at the heart
of differing conceptions of administrative law. One traditional conception of
administrative law has, as its primary purpose, the protection of the individual
from the state; another involves a more facilitative role, one that sees the role
of administrative law as implementing various governmental programs. The
seek to evaluate the present in relation to some single, fixed ideal-type globalized world,
whether a global market or a global civilization. Rather, transformationalist accounts
emphasize globalization as a long-term historical process which is inscribed with
contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors.
Id. at7.
66. Id.
67. See generally CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 9-10 (1 st ed.
1984).
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more one distrusts governmental intervention, the more procedure may be
used or overused to protect individuals-the so-called "red light" approaches
to administrative law. The more political support there is for the substance of
democratically enacted legislation, the more the procedure focuses on
implementation (and less on the protection of individual rights)."
Notwithstanding a large middle ground between these two conceptions of
administrative law, laissez-faire markets and market values are closely tied to
red light approaches to administrative law.
Quite apart from philosophical differences over the appropriate role of
governmental intervention, the APA itself embodies two distinct procedural
approaches that reflect these very different starting points on the role of
government-the provisions for adjudication69 and those for informal
rulemaking.70 The adjudicatory provisions of the APA, when properly
triggered, provide the individual many of the procedural protections
historically found in federal and state courts; informal rulemaking
proceedings, however, were clearly designed to implement legislation in ways
that were not unduly complex or burdensome. Indeed, section 553 rulemaking
was once described by Professor K.C. Davis as "one of the greatest legal
inventions of modem government." 7'
Thejudicialization of administrative procedure has been a persistent trend
in administrative law over the years.72 Judicialization has gone well beyond
the development of adjudicatory procedures and their use when informal
rulemaking would suffice. Informal rulemaking itself has become so
proceduralized as to spawn a literature that refers to such issues as rule
ossification. Various forms of risk-benefit assessments have been imposed,
often in such demanding and complex ways as to justify criticism of the
administrative process as a form of "paralysis by analysis."'74 Indeed, given
the complex and excessive costs that over-proceduralization can cause,
deregulation takes on added force as a regulatory reform. If substantive
results are impossible in any event, why not give the market a chance? But the
complexity of procedural approaches to various regulatory issues is often a
68. Id.
69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554,556,557 (2001).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2001). See also Shapiro, supra note 32, at 453.
71. See KENNETh C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed. Supp. 1970).
72. See Verkuil, supra note 17; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis:
Some Structural and Procedural Lessons, 65 CORNELL L REV. 491,493 (1980).
73. See Pierce, supra note 34, at 60-66.
74. David C. Vladeck & Thomas 0. McGarity, Paralysis By Analysis: How Conservatives Plan to
Kill Popular Regulation, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 78.
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sign of fundamental disagreement over whether there should be any regulation
at all. If there is no political consensus in favor of eliminating certain
substantive regulations, for example, laissez-faire procedures can prevent
their future effectiveness without repeal. This kind of procedural approach to
administrative law is of a piece with a conception of globalization based
primarily on markets as being ends in themselves.
A more pragmatic view of globalization as a series of transformative
public/private partnerships, however, provides the scope to broaden the
purposes of administrative law by moving past long-standing, state-centered
debates between government and the market. Rather than the either/or debates
of the market versus the state, coded as private versus public, I advocate
approaching globalization from a standpoint that regards markets and market
forces as forms of regulation. Thus, possibilities for transformation turn very
much on how markets are produced under globalization and how globalization
yields new law. As I argue in the following sections, neither the laissez-faire
nor the resistance models of globalization do much to advance the traditional
debate in administrative law between government and the market."
Understanding globalization in a transformative way, however, suggests that
states, because of their own territorial limits, must operate in new ways,
partnering with private and public entities alike. Such a conception of
globalization can help us understand the uses of the market as an integral part
of governance, not as an abdication of the public's role. This approach raises
questions about the purposes of administrative law, creates opportunities to
broaden its scope, and deepens the debates about its role beyond the either/or
notions of market versus state that have been so prevalent in the past.
A. Laissez Faire, Resistance, and Administrative Law
A minimalist regulatory approach is one way of leveling the playing field,
thereby minimizing regulatory competition and maximizing economic
efficiency. Even a pure laissez-faire market approach, however, would
recognize a place for law on both the international and domestic levels of
governance, but this would be largely in the creation of the property rights that
are necessary for markets to operate freely. 6 From an administrative law
75. Both models may be appropriate for some issues and I do not wish to suggest that state centered
administrative law is not or should not be important; nor do I wish to suggest that sometimes pure market
approaches may not be appropriate.
76. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
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perspective, the best kind of procedure would be no procedure at all, except,
perhaps, for that provided by the common law. Private markets would rule.
True deregulation, in the form of privatization as opposed to simply less
regulation, would be in order." Deregulation at the agency level requires
processes to achieve this outcome;7' however, once markets are substituted for
regulatory regimes, there should be little or no need for the kinds of processes
that are associated, for example, with the APA.79 Market incentives and
disincentives would be paramount. If substantive regulation is necessary, it
would be limited to antitrust.80
An administrative law tied to this kind of across-the-board market
approach to governance would emphasize bright-line distinctions between
public and private law and between public and private sectors, while striving
to enlarge the private sector and shrink the public sector. Market populism
would fit easily within this model and privatization of all kinds could be seen
as establishing markets and market approaches as ends in themselves, rather
than as part of an ongoing governance process designed to achieve common
public interest goals.
On the other hand, an administrative law premised largely on a globally
skeptical point of view would essentially be status quo ante in its orientation.
This is especially true if state-centered resistance legislation is enacted or
contemplated."' As for the hyperglobalists, a bright line would exist between
the public and the private for those wishing to resist global forces, but the
public sector would be expected to continue to play an active, regulatory role
and to expand, if possible. At one end of the skeptical or resistance to
globalization spectrum is the firm belief of some advocates that the state can
resist global forces and the changes that derive, for example, from free trade 2
77. Id. at 605-10. There may be some contexts, however, in which the common law is not enough.
See id. at 367 ("Pollution, for example, would not be considered a serious problem if the common law
remedies, such as nuisance and trespass, were efficient methods of minimizing the costs of pollution.").
78. Informal rulemaking procedures apply to deregulation as well as regulation. See, e.g., Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,41 (1983).
79. See, e.g.,Alfred C. Aman Jr.,Deregulation in the United States: Transition to the PromisedLand
a New Regulatory Paradigm, or Back to the Future?, in THE LUaERALIZATION OF STATE MONOP011ES IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 271 (Damien Geradin ed., 2000) (noting that the fundamental theory
of contestability was the driving force in deregulating the airlines in 1977).
80. This is what was lacking in airlines. See Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1059 (1987).
81. See, e.g., Steel Revitalization Act, H.R. 808, 107th Cong. (2001) ("A bill to provide certain
safeguards with respect to the domestic steel industry."); HR. Res. 16, 107th Cong. (2001) ("Calling on
the President to take all necessary measures to respond to the surge of steel imports resulting from the
financial crises in Asia, Russia, and other regions, and for other purposes.").
82. See Uruguay Round Agreements of the Gen. Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: Hearing Before
2001]
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 8:379
or relatively open borders when it comes to immigration.83 At the other end
of the spectrum, a skeptic may accept globalization, but resist free trade
agreements that do not forcefully require a leveling up of environmental
protection and wages." Skeptics might also resist so-called fast-track
legislation on the grounds that free trade treaties need more, not less, political
scrutiny to ensure the inclusion of fundamental political values such as fair
wages and a clean environment.
In short, global skeptics have a strong-state view of globalization. They
believe globalization can be resisted if there is the political will to do so, 5 but
process remains crucial in all attempts to harmonize or coordinate regulatory
approaches across the board. It is also important when market proponents
seek to deregulate or privatize segments of the economy. The administrative
law that results under conceptions of resistance will likely be similar in focus
to the roles administrative law has always played. In various deregulatory
settings, for example, administrative law would emphasize the kind of
procedural role usually reserved for the protection of individuals from the
state, by making it as procedurally complex to deregulate as the pro-market
forces make it to regulate in the first place. In short, such a conception of
administrative law would seek, at a minimum, to maintain, if not expand, the
public side of the public/private distinction.
B. Transformative Administrative Law
A third approach to understanding the relationship of globalization and
law discussed above focuses on the transformative nature of globalization.
Global forces and processes leave considerable room for domestic legislation.
An approach to administrative law that focuses on the interchanges between
domestic and external actors, as well as public/private partnerships, should
concentrate on the need for transparency and participation. For example, the
public and private aspect of the partnerships between the government and the
private sector place a premium on the law's ability to provide for participation
in, and accountability with respect to, some of the decisions made by the
private sector. A transformative sense of globalization would not necessarily
the House Small Business Comm., 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Ralph Nader), available at 1994 WL
230684 [hereinafter Nader].
83. See Bagehot, supra note 62.
84. See Nader, supra note 82. Nader argues adamantly that free trade agreements will stand in
opposition to the environmental protectionist goals of the American citizen. Id.
85. See Aman, The Globalizing State, supra note 2, at 803-08.
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view the privatization of public services such as prisons or the determination
of welfare eligibility as a return of those activities to the market. By focusing
on the public functions of the enterprises plus the power relationships between
the companies and the individuals involved, public law protections may be
extended to these private entities.8 6
The new administrative law will often deal with technologies that are
global in nature, such as various forms of information technology. The issues
involved-whether they be privacy and data protection or global climate
change-are transnational in scope, particularly with regard to the so-called
line between public and private and to the need for transparency and
participation.
A transformative approach sees the transjurisdictional possibilities at the
state and local level in terms similar to those at the international level, whether
we are dealing with global technologies or the privatization of local services.
For example, decisions to opt for privatization of prisons or snow removal are
part of the same kind of global framework that exists at the international level.
The markets for such services need not be seen as private, but rather as a
means of carrying out a public responsibility."" Issues of scale drive economic
competitions between and among jurisdictions within a single country or
region, and necessitate the ability to think across jurisdictional lines, even
though such issues are local and not transnational. This, however, does not
minimize the need for public input. The public/private nature of the
partnerships involved, and the global, transjurisdictional aspects of many of
the technologies, problems, and opportunities involved, necessitate flexible,
efficient, procedural approaches premised on the need to provide information
to citizens.
Still another legal aspect involved in a transformative approach to
administrative law is the fact that many legal forums of governance operate
at the same time. Various levels of government must interact and cooperate
with each other in order to grasp new understandings of the market, the role
of the private sector, and the degree to and ways in which the state might be
involved. For example, effective environmental law regulation often requires
coordination and cooperation at the local, state, federal, and international
levels."8 The basic principles of the APA remain relevant for these emerging
86. For a more detailed discussion of how the APA could be changed to reflect such developments,
and of the role that some approaches to international law might play, see Aman, Privatization and the
Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Margaret Brusasco MacKenzie, European Community Law and the Environment, in
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multilevel governmental and multi-market paradigms; however, the procedural
questions involved can no longer be answered solely by the classic green
light/red light approaches to administrative law.89 The role of law must now
be constructed in a way that is not focused on the state alone-either
protecting citizens from it or furthering its direct purposes. Given the fact that
public/private global issues can often be hidden from view,"e a primary
purpose of the new administrative law is to provide the information necessary
for citizens to hold both the government and the private sector responsible for
their respective actions."'
Understanding the need for transparency and participation, and the role
that administrative law can play in that regard, is important because the use
of some markets should not be viewed simplistically as a return to the private
sector. Globalization means that market failure and success travel the same
routes. For example, privatization of social services is different than the
deregulation of communications."2 Advances in technology may now make
competition possible in cable television, whereas privatization of services
such as prisons is based more on the high cost of those obligatory public
responsibilities. As already noted, markets do not substitute for or displace
regulation, but rather achieve public interest ends in their new so-called
private settings.
To emphasize the public character of privately run institutions such as
prisons is not to suggest that the kinds of procedures developed in the APA or
applicable under the Due Process clauses are necessarily appropriate or
sufficient. 3 The fact that a private entity is more public than private (thereby,
perhaps, justifying the extension of the Constitution), is not by itself
procedurally sufficient for the new public/private paradigms that are now
emerging. This is particularly the case when our focus is on democracy,
transparency, and public participation as well as individual fairness. For
citizens to have the information that is necessary to make public participation
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 71 (Alan Boyle ed., 1994).
89. See HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 15.
90. For example, the privatization of traditional governmental services is often based on the premise
that, in the implementation of such a contract, administration and policy making are separate. This is
seldom the case. See Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40, 56-58 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
91. Increasingly, this must mean new conceptions of citizenship, including global citizenship. For
a collection of articles concerning this subject see generally Symposium, The State of Citizenship, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
92. See Aman, Privatization and the Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
93. Id.
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meaningful, transparent decisionmaking is necessary." Whether the
governing unit is public or private is not as important as the power
relationships involved and the nature of the tasks being performed.
A transformative sense of globalization requires that we imagine a new,
fundamental purpose for administrative law, one that goes beyond the market
or the government. That new purpose will include, at a minimum, the need to
facilitate the flow of information that is necessary to create the kind of politics
that will make effective governance and government possible, whether the
actors involved are public or private. The relationship of the citizen to the
state has long been a central tenet of administrative law. For that relationship
to be meaningful, the citizenry must be informed and active and public/private
relationships must be included.
In short, the various relationships of globalization to markets set forth
above imply very different views on the question of what the role of
administrative law can and should be. With a transformative approach to
administrative law, the line between the public and the private is blurred at
best. Public/private partnerships, new forms of collective action, and
imaginative ways of solving community-wide issues are embraced. Rather
than take the public or, especially, the private sector as a given, a
transformative approach looks to the functions being performed to determine
the public or private nature of the actions involved. As a result, one of the
principal aspects of an approach tied to this conception of globalization is the
recognition of the need to extend administrative law protections, albeit
creatively conceived, to what was once seen as the private sector.
Other key aspects of the new administrative law that can emerge from this
perspective are coordination and flexibility. They stem from the
transjurisdictional nature of the problems involved. These procedural
attributes are necessary because much of the relevant regulation is based on
markets, but the markets are themselves a means to achieve public goals. 5
They are regulatory devices, part of the repertoire that policymakers, both
public and private, now employ. As such, markets and the discipline and
incentives they entail should be subject to techniques that encourage
94. For an in-depth discussion of the history of public participation, or the lack thereof, in trade
negotiations, see Brian J. Schoenborn, Public Participation in Trade Negotiations: Open Agreements.
Openly Arrived A?, 4 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 103 (1995). See also Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory
Revolution " in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L REv. 537 (1997).
95. For a discussion of different kinds of nrkets and matching forms of democracies, see Aman,
Privatization and the Democracy Problem, supra note 13.
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accountability and participation. At the same time, the flexibility and
efficiency they promote must, to the extent possible, be preserved.
CONCLUSION
All three of these conceptions of globalization-the market, the state, and
a more transformative combination of the two--can and often do overlap in
various ways. The development of domestic administrative law may embody
more than one conception and, at times, all of them. But the more we mix
public and private and create various hybrid entities that rely on private
structures, private ordering, and private groups to carry out public goals, the
more we move from an administrative law focused on government to one that
seeks to facilitate governance, whether in the public, private, or public/private
sectors.
Though the private sector has long played an important role in conceiving
and carrying out governmental policies, the processes of globalization now
require new ways of understanding its role and the new role that
administrative law must play if such basic values as participation and
transparency are to remain significant in the future. The days in which
administrative law was focused solely on the government are over. The
interplay of markets, rules, and private and public actors requires not only less
regulation of some markets and industries, but more accountability of and
public participation in the policy outcomes that are presently delegated to
markets. For this to occur, administrative law must now adopt as one of its
primary purposes the creation of the information flow that is necessary to hold
both governments and private actors accountable. In so doing, we must
transcend outmoded analyses that seek to label entities as either public or
private and focus instead on their functions and the procedures that are
necessary to ensure a vibrant democracy.
